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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2303
___________
CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,
Appellant
v.
REHKA HALLIGAN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00169)
District Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 5, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 16, 2019)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Christopher Young appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights action
for failure to state a claim. Because this case does not present a substantial question, we
will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
On May 25, 2018, Young filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Dr.
Rehka Halligan deprived him of necessary medical care while incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). Young generally alleged that Dr.
Halligan never adequately treated him for his illnesses, left him untreated at times despite
his numerous complaints, and told him that he did not need a specialist, which he
contended violated the Eighth Amendment and Pennsylvania state law for medical
malpractice/negligence.
Dr. Halligan submitted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The District Court ultimately granted Dr. Halligan’s motion to dismiss.
With regard to Young’s Eighth Amendment claims, the District Court thoroughly
detailed the various drug treatments and tests administered by Dr. Halligan and other
medical staff at SCI-Albion, and determined that both Young’s complaint and the
proposed amended complaint1 indicated that he had received frequent and comprehensive
attention for his medical conditions. Indeed, the District Court noted that Young was
examined at least 40 times during the time period at issue, which included attention from
outside specialists, a litany of various medical tests, and the administration of various

1

Instead of an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Young submitted an amended
complaint without leave of the court on. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
2

drugs to address Young’s symptoms. The District Court determined that Dr. Halligan’s
treatment decisions were the product of her medical judgment and held that Young’s
dissatisfaction with those decisions amounted to nothing more than a disagreement
between an inmate and his treating physician over alternative treatment plans, which was
not actionable under the Eighth Amendment.
With regard to the state law claims for medical malpractice/negligence, the
District Court determined that Young failed to file a certificate of merit as required by
Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, despite being provided with
the requisite notice of the need to do so. The court held that this failure required
dismissal of those claims. Young timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of
Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient
factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
We agree with the District Court that Young failed to allege a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim. Here, Young failed to allege that Dr. Halligan was deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Young did not allege—nor could he—that he was refused medical care or treatment by
3

Dr. Halligan. To the contrary, he was seen approximately 40 times by Dr. Halligan or
other SCI-Albion medical staff, given various medical tests, and prescribed medication to
address his various medical problems. Thus, Young’s claims rested on his disagreement
with the method by which Dr. Halligan provided his medical care. Because Young failed
to allege that Dr. Halligan’s treatment methods otherwise violated professional standards
of care, Young failed to state a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Because ‘mere disagreement as
to the proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an [E]ighth [A]mendment
violation,’ when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is
proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” (internal citation
omitted)).
Furthermore, we agree that Young’s failure to file a certificate of merit (“COM”)
necessitated dismissal of his state law claims. See Pa. R. Civ. P. No. 1042.3 (requiring a
plaintiff to file a COM within 60 days after filing a professional negligence complaint).
Here, Dr. Halligan provided Young notice of her intent to dismiss his state law claims
due to Young’s noncompliance with Rule 1042.3. See Dkt. #14; See Pa. R. Civ. P. Nos.
1042.6–7 (stating a defendant may move to dismiss the case for failure to file a COM;
however, a plaintiff’s case will not be dismissed for failure to timely file a COM unless
the defendant has given notice of her intent to seek dismissal). Young has yet to file a
COM, despite this notice. Because both the COM requirement and notice requirement
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are substantive laws under the Erie2 doctrine, the District Court properly dismissed
Young’s state law negligence/malpractice claims. See Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113,
119–20 (3d Cir. 2015) (notice requirement); Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659
F.3d 258, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2011) (COM requirement).
Finally, the District Court did not err in dismissing the complaint without
providing Young an opportunity to amend, because, as his proposed amended complaint
demonstrates, amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. In light of our disposition, Young’s
pending motion for appointment of counsel is denied as moot.
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Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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